Qualified majority voting in the EU is a long way off

The demand to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy has grown steadily louder in Brussels. In 2026, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has put forward a six-point plan for abolishing unanimity in the area of foreign policy, but practice shows just how far this goal is from being realized.

The gap between the rhetoric of abandoning the veto and the readiness of states to use it when their own interests are at stake is structural. In the area of “low politics” which cover questions such as trade regimes, tariffs, competition, technical standards, market regulation, agriculture, and selected strands of social and economic policy, mutual concessions and compromises are possible. States can delegate powers without relinquishing political autonomy.

It was assumed that economic integration would gradually grow into political integration. However, this logic operates only as long as integration does not encroach on “high politics”: foreign-policy orientation, defence, security, the use of force, relations with great powers, and a country’s place in the international system. Here, what is at stake are questions of political survival, status, and the autonomy of the state. An example: In February 2026, Hungary and Slovakia blocked the 20th package of sanctions against Russia because of the halting of oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline. For the majority, sanctions were an instrument of pressure; for Budapest and Bratislava, they touched on energy supply, industry, and domestic political stability.

The transition from a common market to a common foreign policy is therefore not a natural continuation of integration. Economic interdependence does not erase differences in foreign policy interests. Handing another centre the right to determine allies, threats, the permissibility of using force, and the price of risk touches the very foundation of sovereignty.

Abolishing unanimity in the realm of high politics was impossible at earlier stages of integration and remains impossible today. States are prepared to hand technical and executive matters to majority voting, but not the right to determine their allies, threats, foreign policy orientation, or the acceptable price of risk. Abolishing the veto will not create a common strategic interest where none exists. It will merely allow the majority to impose on individual countries decisions that those countries may regard as a threat to their own security.